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Constitutional Law, United
States
Jethro K. Lieberman
Constitutional law, in the USA, is the body of
cases through which the courts, especially the
Supreme Court, have interpreted the US
constitution (or the state courts the meaning of
state constitutions). More rarely, it is a descriptive term for the text of the constitution itself.
The shortest constitution in the world (about
7500 words, including the amendments), the
constitution does not serve as a detailed code
of rights or conduct. In structuring the federal
government, establishing its relationship with

state governments, and granting and limiting
its powers, the constitution necessarily speaks
in general, even obscure, terms, requiring
courts to determine whether challenged laws
and governmental practices are consistent with
its text. That courts do so is the consequence of
the Supreme Court's decision in 1803 in
Marbury v. Madison, which held that the judicial review is part of the power assigned to the
courts in Article III of the constitution itself.
Constitutional law does not embrace every
part of the text, in part because some structural
provisions are so specific that they are impervious to constitutional challenge and in part
because the Supreme Court has limited the
sorts of issues that can be raised. On the structural side, the text is explicit, for example, that
each state is entitled to elect two members of
the Senate, that to become law a bill must be
enacted by both houses of Congress and be
presented to the president for signature, and
that presidents may veto bills. Courts cannot
alter these foundational rules, though in
permitting Congress to delegate power to
federal administrative agencies, the Supreme
Court has overseen the development of the
administrative state, a significant constitutional structural revolution in lawmaking not
contemplated in the original text.
On the judicial side, the Supreme Court has
drawn rules and principles from the
constitution that determine what claims courts
may hear and decide. Unlike the practice in
constitutional courts in Hungary, India, Israel,
South Africa, and some other nations, US federal courts may not take it upon themselves to
render "advisory opinions" or pronounce on
constitutional issues if the parties do not have
"standing" - an interest in the litigation outcome resulting from a direct injury suffered or
to be suffered. The standing requirement is one
of a number of principles that insulate some
constitutional questions from judicial decisionmaking - for example, the constitutionality of
various public welfare and spending programs.
Another such principle is the bar on courts
considering "political questions" that are committed to other branches of government - for
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example, whether or not to veto a bill or engage
in foreign affairs is exclusively a question for
the president.
The vast bulk of constitutional law, therefore, consists in the elaboration of rules that
determine the limits of federal and state
authority. Some cases challenge the breadth of
power exercised. By far, the most numerous
constitutional cases concern whether the
government has (1) violated specified rights
(to speech, press, religion, association, equality,
liberty, and property); (2) disregarded specific
restraints (prohibitions against ex post facto
laws, self-incrimination, and cruel and unusual
punishments); and (3) ignored procedural
rules (guaranteeing criminal defendants a fair
trial by an impartial jury, the writ of habeas
corpus, the right to counsel and to confront
witnesses against them, and the due process
requirement that the government not act arbitrarily or irrationally).
Although structural cases are rarer, an
important body of constitutional law concerns
"separation of powers" - the assignment of
principal powers of government to its three
branches (legislative, executive, and judicial).
The Supreme Court is called on now and then
to police the borders of these branches,
declaring when one branch has usurped the
powers of another and when the branches may
legitimately share in powers. Under this heading, constitutional law has authorized
administrative agencies to make and enforce
federal law.
In crafting constitutional law from the few
express textual commandments, the courts frequently look to principles that lie outside the
explicit text. They use various "canons of
construction" and interpretive rules to guide
their decisions. For example, the Supreme
Court will try to avoid answering constitutional questions if the case can be resolved otherwise. It professes to adhere to stare decisis
- that is, to follow precedent - and often, but
not always, does. Whether to abide by the
"original intent" of the constitutional framers
or ratifiers is a matter of continuing controversy, but the text itself is silent on the issue. Its
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only rule of interpretation is in the Ninth
Amendment, which says that the absence of a
specific right from the text may not serve as a
ground to deny the right - a rule on which the
Supreme Court has almost never relied as the
basis of a decision.
Until the Civil War, federal constitutional
law, including, importantly, the restraints in
the Bill of Rights, applied only to the federal
government. Ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868 worked a significant
change. Federal courts acquired jurisdiction
over state actions, pre-eminently denial of due
process and equal protection, that previously
had been free of federal oversight. Ultimately,
the Supreme Court applied most of the Bill of
Rights to the states, forged strong constitutional rules against racial and other forms of
discrimination, and recognized rights not
expressly covered in the constitutional text, like
the right to privacy and its associated right
to individual autonomy in such matters as
abortion.
The constitution may be amended under
procedures in Article V. But the formal process
is difficult and has succeeded only 18 times in
225 years. Constitutional flexibility arises from
the courts' power to declare constitutional law:
reinterpreting text as conditions warrant and
become politically possible, but only in those
areas in which cases can be framed as genuine
questions in justiciable controversies. Constitutional law is thus the body of judicial interpretations of the most important of the delphic
and undefined rights, restraints, and powers
set out in the constitution.
SEE ALSO: Constitution, Unwritten;
Constitutionalism; Separation of Powers
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Constitutionalism
Jethro K. Lieberman
Constitutionalism is a central and protean
political concept that for more than two millennia has never surrendered to a formal, fixed
definition. In its earliest incarnation, constitutionalism was taken merely as descriptive fact.
To the ancient Greeks, the constitution meant
"the state as it actually is" (Mcilwain 1966: 26).
Today the idea of constitutionalism comprises
a cluster of particular jurisprudential and
sociological attributes, summed up as "limited
government under a higher law" (Fellman
1973: 485). Manifestly, not every state claiming
independent sovereignty can lay claim to the
constitutional mantle.
Beginning in the Roman Republic, and wandering in and out of political and legal consciousness for a millennium and a half, the
concept mutated: it came to be held that there
was law antecedent to the state, that it came
from the people, or custom, or God, or the
natural order, and that even private citizens, as
members of the public, may seek relief from
the government's abuse of the citizenry's public
rights. The idea was fitful and equivocal. Some
kings acknowledged they were subject to the
law; others, at different times and in different
places, clung to a divine right to command at
will. In England, from the twelfth century, the
judges held that the king was obligated to
follow the law, meaning, for example, that he
could not imprison someone who had not been
tried in court. By the sixteenth century, "a
man's home is his castle" that not even the king
could invade was an adage that expressed the
deeply entrenched notion of rights superior to

the arbitrary will of the ruler. Through Magna
Carta (1215), the Habeas Corpus Act (1614),
the Bill of Rights (1689), the Act of Settlement
(1701), and other parliamentary enactments, a
British constitution was gradually assembled.
Modern constitutionalism in practice
emerged with the American Revolution. For
the drafters and ratifiers of the world's oldest
continuing written constitution, a constitution
was, as Thomas Paine put it, "the act of the ...
people constituting a government;' and, he
might have added, with terms and conditions
attached (Paine 1991: 82). As Walton H.
Hamilton wryly observed: "Constitutionalism
is the name given to the trust which men
repose in the power of words engrossed on
parchment to keep a government in order"
(1937: 255). Constitutionalism is not just
any government and not just any order.
Constitutionalism rejects arbitrary government; it recognizes and respects people's rights
despite the contrary will of officials or even
popular majorities.
Different commentators have made these
points in different ways: "Constitutionalism
has one essential quality; it is a legal limitation
on government" (Mcilwain 1966: 21). Constitutionalism is "a determinate, stable legal
order which prevents the arbitrary exercise of
political power and subjects both the governed
and the governors to 'one law for all' [people]"
(Dunner 1964: 120). A "constitution is necessary in order to limit government and . . . if
there is to be government by consent" (Scruton
1984: 94). And, from the time ofMontesquieu,
constitutionalism absorbed the maxim, in
James Madison's words, that the "accumulation
of all powers . . . in the same hands . . . may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny" (Madison 1961: 301).
Modern constitutionalism, then, seems to
consist of these ingredients: (1) a fixed and
public constitution, (2) ratified by the people,
(3) equally applicable to all, that restrains arbitrary decrees by (4) separating government
powers and (5) mandating impartial and fair
procedures, and (6) that permits the people
through regular elections to select their leaders,

all in order (7) to preserve space in which at
least some degree of individual autonomy may
flourish.
Promulgation of a constitution does not
guarantee constitutionalism. Sham constitutions, like the Soviet Union's, or illiberal constitutions, like Iran's, often prescribe restraints
on government (for example, guarantees of
freedom of speech, press, and assembly). But
these are cosmetic dressing on an authoritarian skin, ignored when their exercise would
"harrn'' the interests of the state or society or
counter the interests of an entrenched ruling
class. Nor do such constitutions provide people procedures to enforce their rights. In the
Soviet Union, as in other nations that pretend
to constitutionalism, the basic charter did not
restrain the government; rather, the unelected
Communist Party, which alone dictated the
interests of state and society, emasculated
the constitution. Likewise, in many illiberal
states, as for example in theocratic Iran, the
constitution may expressly restrain the
government, but in favor not of individual
rights-holders but of a clerical class who rule
on theological principles that lie outside constitutional norms and procedures.
Despite the general agreement on the
essential norms and practices of constitutionalism, there is no definitive model and some
basic questions remain unsettled. Students of
the subject point to a host of constitutional
variables, no single one of which appears to
be crucial to determining whether a people
enjoy constitutionalism: must the constitution
be written or unwritten, detailed or general,
long or short, judicially enforceable or not,
republican or monarchical, parliamentary or
presidential, federal or unitary? So, for example,
though constitutionalism is often said to
require a written constitution, some practices
are observed as constitutional norms despite
the lack of text. Until Franklin D. Roosevelt
violated it in 1940, an unwritten tradition
dating back to Washington in 1796 kept US
presidents from serving more than two terms;
Roosevelt's disregard of it led to the 22nd
Amendment, mandating the limit.
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A central problem for constitutionalism is
the enforcement of constitutional norms. In
the USA, there is no effective dissent from the
practice, established in 1803 by Chief Justice
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, that courts in
appropriate cases may overturn statutes as
unconstitutional. But the idea of a constitutional court, though gaining ground around
the world, is not a necessary component of
constitutionalism. Legislatures and executives
may feel bound by constitutional norms, even
though they have the formal power to disregard them. Not since 1707 have British monarchs vetoed legislation enacted by parliament,
though they have the "legal" authority to do so.
In the USA, decisions to impeach and convict
federal officials, such as the president and
judges, are wholly in the hands of Congress
under the constitution itself, but the impeachment power has been used only sparingly and
when, occasionally, it was misused, the Senate
refused to convict. That said, it is also indisputable that constitutional norms can change so
that what was once thought to be perfectly
plain and acceptable to one generation becomes
unthinkable, as a matter of constitutional
law, to another. The most spectacular example
in American history is the Supreme Court's
change of mind on the question of racial segregation from its 1896 decision in Plessy v.
Ferguson to its decision in 1954 in Brown v.
Board of Education.
While far from universal - there remain
many repressive governments with only farcical claims to constitutionalism - the idea of
constitutionalism has spread throughout the
world during the second half of the twentieth
century and is continuing still. Human rights
principles adopted at Nuremberg during the
trial of Nazi war criminals, in the International
Declaration of Human Rights, and in many
other international treaties and instruments,
and the establishment of such bodies as the
International Criminal Court in The Hague,
all point to an emerging consensus on the
value and necessity of constitutional regimes
that promote individual and human rights.
Whether countries that have survived political

